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COMBATING MIDNIGHT REGULATION 
Jack M. Beermann 
The flurry of regulatory activity by the outgoing administration of 
President George W. Bush has raised, once again, the specter of midnight 
regulation.1  In contrast to the late-term action of the Clinton Administra-
tion, much of the Bush Administration‘s late-term action seems to have 
been more deregulatory than regulatory, but from a political and legal 
standpoint, that distinction may not make much, if any, difference.  While 
midnight regulation provokes an instinctively negative reaction, it is not 
completely clear what is wrong with it.  This uncertainty arises in part be-
cause of the different reasons for midnight regulation.  In my earlier work 
on this subject, I identified four possible reasons for late-term action, and in 
this Essay I add a fifth, although I confess a lack of knowledge on whether 
this fifth reason is actually a significant factor in midnight regulation.  The 
original four are: (1) the natural human tendency to work to deadline, which 
has been referred to in the literature as the ―Cinderella constraint;‖2 (2) hur-
rying to take as much action as possible near the end of the term to project 
the administration‘s agenda into the future; (3) waiting to take potentially 
controversial action until the end of the term when the political conse-
quences are likely to be muted; and (4) delay by some external force that 
prevented the administration from taking desired action until late in the 
term.  The fifth, and new, possible reason for late-term action I call ―tim-
ing.‖  Timing is a form of waiting, not based on potential negative conse-
quences, but rather, based on the desire to achieve something positive 
before the presidential election in order to help either one‘s own reelection 
bid or the election prospects of the incumbent party.  One can imagine, for 
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  ‖Midnight regulation‖ is loosely defined as late-term action by an outgoing administration.  There 
are many types of midnight regulation and many reasons why the volume of administrative action tends 
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ing Post-Election Quarters (Mar. 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Northwestern Uni-
versity Law Review), available at http://www.mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=17546 (link). 
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ry action for the automobile industry if Michigan looks like a swing state in 
the upcoming election. 
Whatever the reason for midnight regulation, there seems to be a gen-
eral perception that something has gone wrong when an outgoing adminis-
tration takes important action while the incoming administration is waiting 
to take over.  Most late-term action is subject to the obvious question of 
why, if the regulation was deemed so important, the administration failed to 
act during the previous three or seven and three-quarters years.  The lines of 
normative critique of midnight regulation are fairly evinced by each of the 
factors posited above.  Thus, even though the Constitution leaves the in-
cumbent in office for approximately eleven weeks after election day, the 
public feels uncomfortable when an outgoing administration waits until late 
in the term to take politically controversial action or loads up on late-term 
actions to project its policy preferences in the future. 
There is one consequence of midnight regulation that may not be com-
pletely obvious and should be highlighted.  Especially as our collective ex-
perience with midnight regulation has grown, the outgoing President knows 
that the incoming administration is likely to look carefully at late-term ac-
tions by the outgoing administration.  President George W. Bush certainly 
had plenty of experience with the time and energy it took for his administra-
tion to freeze and then review dozens of late-term actions taken by the Clin-
ton Administration.3  Some late-term action is so likely to be overturned by 
the incoming administration that the outgoing administration may have 
acted merely to embarrass the new President or force the new President to 
expend political capital on the matter.  Before they act, outgoing adminis-
trations should take into account the distraction and energy necessarily as-
sociated with reviewing late-term actions.  The President takes an oath to 
―faithfully execute the office of President of the United States,‖4 and the 
outgoing President arguably violates that oath if he overloads the incoming 
administration with midnight rules and other late-term actions that impede 
the incoming President‘s ability to ―take care that that the laws be faithfully 
executed‖ immediately upon taking office.5 
Taking into consideration the factors discussed above, this Essay ex-
amines possible ways to combat midnight regulation.  The discussion be-
gins with a recent proposal in Congress to restrict rulemaking activity 
during the last ninety days of an outgoing administration by giving the in-
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during those final ninety days.  Part I of the Essay explains the bill and 
identifies potential problems with it.  Part II offers two alternative ap-
proaches: one involves a simple reform to administrative law, and the other 
outlines statutory proposals that differ from the bill proposed by Represent-
ative Nadler. 
I. REPRESENTATIVE NADLER‘S PROPOSAL 
On January 6, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York intro-
duced H.R. 34.6  The fundamental provision of the bill is that no rule 
adopted in the final ninety days of an outgoing administration (a ―midnight 
rule‖) can go into effect until ninety days after the appointment of a new 
agency head by the new President.7  The newly appointed agency head may, 
during his or her first ninety days in office, disapprove of a midnight rule by 
publishing a notice of disapproval in the Federal Register and providing a 
notice of disapproval to ―the congressional committees of jurisdiction.‖8  
However, if the new agency head takes no action within ninety days, the 
midnight rule goes into effect. 
Additionally, the bill contains provisions that would enable the out-
going President to put a midnight rule directly into effect.  The outgoing 
President can do so by declaring in an Executive Order, with separate writ-
ten notice to Congress, that the rule is ―necessary because of an imminent 
threat to health or safety or other emergency; necessary for the enforcement 
of criminal laws; necessary for national security; or issued pursuant to a sta-
tute implementing an international trade agreement.‖9  The bill further pro-
vides that it applies retroactively to all rules issued after October 22, 2008, 
which is ninety days before President Barack Obama‘s inauguration.  As 
these broad provisions might suggest, even a cursory reading of the bill re-
veals that it has some relatively serious drafting problems.  Although an ex-
haustive enumeration is not possible in this Essay, the following discussion 
focuses on a few operational issues that demonstrate why the bill is a less 
than ideal solution to the midnight regulation problem. 
A. Blanket Delay 
The provision, imposing a blanket delay of the effective date of all 
rules adopted in the last ninety days of an outgoing administration until ni-
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lems.  The bill‘s language does not provide exceptions for instances in 
which the incoming administration would rather have the midnight rules go 
into effect, for example if the incoming administration is of the same party 
or in which midnight rules were the product of cooperation between the in-
coming and outgoing administrations.  There is no provision for allowing 
an incoming President to allow all or some midnight rules to go into effect 
immediately.10  The bill grants only the outgoing President the authority to 
place midnight rules directly into effect and only if certain conditions are 
met.11  If those conditions are not met, or if the outgoing administration 
would prefer to leave the issue to the incoming administration, the bill‘s 
lack of flexibility would be problematic.  In some circumstances, and per-
haps especially in times of crisis when quick and decisive action is neces-
sary, incoming and outgoing administrations may work together without 
regard to the election and inauguration cycle.  In such cases, it would likely 
be beneficial to allow the incoming administration to allow midnight rules 
to go into effect immediately.   
The blanket delay of midnight rules may not be as politically beneficial 
to the incoming President as one might think.  For example, the phenome-
non of ―waiting‖ until after election day may enable an outgoing President 
to take actions that might benefit the incoming administration with less re-
gard for political consequences.  An outgoing President acting responsibly 
may take difficult action at the end of the term to pave the way for a smooth 
transition.  By automatically delaying the effective date of rules in this cat-
egory unless the outgoing President uses the authority discussed above to 
advance the effective date, the bill would increase the political costs to the 
outgoing administration and thus discourage this sort of cooperative action. 
B. New Agency Head 
Another problem related to the blanket delay, perhaps unlikely to occur 
in most transitions, is that the bill could place midnight rules into limbo for 
extended periods of time.  The effective date for midnight rules is ninety 
days after the appointment of a new agency head, during which time the 
agency head has the authority to disapprove the rule.  There is no provision 
for a holdover agency head, that is, if the incoming President chooses to 
keep the outgoing administration‘s agency head in place, the bill could be 
read to preclude rules issued in the last ninety days of the outgoing adminis-
tration from going into effect for many months or years.  This may seem to 





  The new administration could avoid the provisions of the bill by re-promulgating midnight rules 
immediately upon taking office, but that would take some work to make sure the process of re-
promulgation was done properly.  Nor, in most cases, would it save much time because of the minimum 
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have a legal argument that the rule has not gone into effect if there is no 
new agency head.  This is obviously an unintended consequence—no one 
wants to discourage a new President from keeping agency heads from the 
prior administration in office.  However, a lengthy delay could also result if 
the appointment of a new agency head encounters a confirmation problem 
or if the incoming administration falls behind in naming new agency heads.  
Of course, if one views midnight rules as virtually always a scourge, then 
the potential for indefinite delay will not be viewed as much of a problem.  
Nevertheless, it does not seem likely that the author of the bill intended to 
create the possibility of indefinite delays in the effective dates of rules. 
Automatically delaying all midnight rules until the appointment of a 
new agency head could also cause political problems for an incoming ad-
ministration.  The incoming administration would find itself in the poten-
tially uncomfortable position of appearing responsible for every rule issued 
in the last ninety days of the outgoing administration.  Newly appointed 
agency heads may then have to spend their first ninety days reviewing mid-
night rules rather than beginning to work on the new President‘s agenda.  
This aspect, however, may be seen by some as a virtue.  With the automatic 
delay of all midnight rules, the incoming administration can at least delay 
the day of reckoning until the ninetieth day after the appointment of a new 
agency head.  If the incoming administration was granted discretion to pick 
and choose among midnight rules to delay, intense pressure may be brought 
to bear at the very outset of the administration, and the new agency heads 
may be forced to act with great haste in a tense environment.  Thus, it is a 
judgment call whether discretion is better or worse than an automatic delay, 
and for reasons discussed in Part II B, in my judgment the potential benefits 
of discretion arguably outweigh the potential costs. 
C. Rules That Should Be Exempt 
Another general problem with the bill is that it fails to account for rules 
for which a delay may be legally questionable or unnecessary.  First, there 
is no indication that rules required by statutory deadlines or court orders are 
exempt.  In their transition-related regulatory review instructions to agen-
cies, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both exempted rules 
required by statutory or judicially imposed deadlines.12  Representative 
Nadler‘s proposal would create a potential conflict with regard to such 
rules, and the bill should either exempt them or at a minimum clarify 
whether the bill‘s intent is to delay rules‘ effective dates beyond deadlines 
established by statute or court order.  Second, there is no mention of rules 
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103:352 (2009) Combating Midnight Regulation 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/9/ 357 
Procedure Act (APA).  Is the intent to include personnel rules and rules re-
lating to government contracts, grants, and benefits, which are completely 
exempt from APA § 553?  What about interpretative rules, policy state-
ments and guidance documents, which are exempt from § 553‘s notice and 
comment provisions?  There are good reasons, discussed in Part II below, 
for not including rules that the new administration could easily alter without 
notice and comment.  The bill should at least address this issue.   
D. Disapproval Only 
A related procedural problem with the bill, equally if not more signifi-
cant, is that the incoming administration‘s only option is to disapprove the 
midnight rule or allow it to go into effect as written.13  There is no option to 
revise a midnight rule.  This means that if the new agency head concludes 
that some sort of rule is necessary, even one that is very close but not exact-
ly the one promulgated by the prior administration, the agency must either 
accept the imperfect rule or engage in expensive and time-consuming rule-
making proceedings to promulgate what might be an only slightly different 
rule.  This can be a real waste if the rulemaking record produced by the 
prior administration is likely to support the rule preferred by the new ad-
ministration, given that the record will still be fresh.  Thus, the bill could 
lead either to waste or to a new administration allowing a suboptimal rule to 
go into effect. 
E. Independent Agency Rules 
Another significant problem is that the bill is not very specific about 
which agencies it covers, and there are good reasons to not extend coverage 
of the bill to independent agencies.  Because the bill would be inserted into 
the APA as 5 U.S.C. § 555a, presumably the APA‘s definition of ―agency‖ 
would apply.  This broad definition includes independent agencies such as 
multi-member commissions and the National Labor Relations Board.14  The 
bill does not explicitly exempt independent agencies from its coverage, but 





  The procedure for disapproving a rule contains a quirk that should be abandoned. It provides that 
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identify an ―agency head‖ for a multi-member agency.  Is it the agency 
chair, or a majority of the agency?  Since new Presidents upon taking office 
do not normally appoint new agency heads for independent agencies, if the 
bill is construed to apply to such agencies, it could force independent agen-
cies to forego issuing rules for the last ninety days of each presidential term.  
Second, the midnight rule problem is not as serious with regard to indepen-
dent agencies because they are bipartisan and because their members serve 
for terms of years that do not coincide with the presidential election cycle.  
Out of loyalty to the President, independent agencies dominated by the in-
cumbent‘s party might time certain actions with the political consequences 
to the President in mind or to avoid rejection by the next Congress.  How-
ever, because independent agencies are not subject to direct supervision by 
any executive branch official, they are less likely than executive branch 
agencies to be acting for the reasons that contribute to the general disfavor-
ing of midnight rules.  Midnight rule reform is simply not needed for inde-
pendent agencies, and the bill should address this.15 
F. Other Procedural Problems 
There are a few other potential procedural problems with the bill 
which, though less likely to cause problems, are still worth addressing.  The 
first concerns the use of the word ―adopted‖ in the definition of ―midnight 
rule.‖  A midnight rule is ―a rule adopted by an agency within the final 90 
days a President serves in office.‖16 The problem is that the bill does not 
contain a definition of the word ―adopted.‖  There is no indication as to 
what precise event demonstrates that an agency has adopted a rule.  There 
are several possibilities, including publication in the Federal Register, sub-
mission to the Federal Register for publication, signing a paper indicating 
that the agency has adopted a rule, and so on.  Any bill on this subject 
should make it crystal clear what it means for a rule to be ―adopted.‖ 
Further, the definition of ―midnight rule‖ creates two situations in 
which it will not be immediately known upon adoption whether a rule is a 
midnight rule.  One situation is where the President is running for reelec-
tion, and it will not be known until after election day whether a rule adopted 
before election day and less than ninety days before January 20 is a mid-
night rule.  This is not a serious problem, because it throws into uncertainty 
only rules adopted in the last two weeks before election day, and none of 
these rules will have yet gone into effect since no rule‘s effective date can 





  It should also be noted that incoming administrations have not included independent agencies in 
their actions aimed that the midnight regulatory activity of their predecessors.  Both the Card and Ema-
nuel memoranda were directed to the heads of ―Executive Departments and Agencies.‖  This is probably 
the result of the lack of midnight activity from independent agencies and doubts about the President‘s 
authority to manage their activities. 
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  See H.R. 34 § 2(a). 
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major rule subject to the Congressional Review Act.17  Nonetheless, it 
seems unlikely that the drafters anticipated the situation in which an agency 
can adopt a rule without knowing whether it will go into effect as stated in 
the rule (in as little as thirty days) or not until ninety days after inauguration 
day, which could amount to a delay of 180 days. 
The second situation of uncertainty involves the potential for an unex-
pected application of the bill when the President does not complete the 
term, because of either death in office or resignation.  In such cases, the bill 
would seem to convert to midnight rules all rules issued in the ninety days 
before the President left office, delaying their effective date until ninety 
days after the new President (normally the incumbent Vice-President) ap-
points new agency heads.  Perhaps midnight regulation concerns exist if a 
President is in a political fight that appears headed for impeachment or res-
ignation (think, for example, of Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich‘s ap-
pointment of Roland Burris to fill Barack Obama‘s Senate seat while under 
indictment and subject to impeachment proceedings) but occurrences like 
this are exceedingly rare.  Given that the new President, being the incum-
bent Vice President, is almost certainly of the same political party as the 
prior President and may retain, at least for a time, many of the prior Presi-
dent‘s agency heads, midnight regulation should not be much of a concern, 
and application of the bill would lead to the problem of prolonged delay 
discussed above when no new agency head is appointed.  Thus, the bill as 
written could require 180 days of uncertainty even when no one thinks that 
the prior President had acted for any of the reasons we normally attribute to 
the midnight regulation problem. 
For these reasons and more, the bill proposed by Representative Nadler 
is not an attractive vehicle for midnight rule reform.  However, this does not 
mean that some form of midnight regulation reform is not desirable or poss-
ible.  The next Part proposes some possibilities, some of which build upon 
Representative Nadler‘s proposal. 
II. MIDNIGHT REGULATION REFORM POSSIBILITIES 
This Part raises two different tacks for dealing with midnight regula-
tion.  The first section addresses a particular feature of administrative law 
that makes it difficult for an incoming administration to repudiate late-term 
action by the outgoing administration.  Basically, under current doctrine, 
once a rule goes into effect, any change must be justified by good reasons 
even if the original rulemaking record would have justified a different rule.  
In the context of midnight regulation, this is an unfortunate requirement.  
The Supreme Court could loosen up on arbitrary and capricious review in 
cases involving changes to rules in transition periods, or even more general-
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rule, or Congress could legislatively provide for more deferential review.  
The second section outlines a statutory model that would grant the incom-
ing administration the power to review and reject or modify late-term action 
by the outgoing administration, similar to the model that the administrations 
of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama followed when they con-
fronted the mass of midnight regulation left behind by their predecessors.  
This model is not different in principle from the bill proposed by Repre-
sentative Nadler, but it employs a more nuanced approach that is more sen-
sitive to the political and legal realities of midnight regulation.  Finally, a 
simpler statutory approach is raised, which would allow agencies at all 
times to revise or rescind recently issued rules when unexpected negative 
feedback erupts after a rule is issued. 
This discussion assumes that some sort of reform to make it easier to 
combat midnight regulation is desirable.  However, it should be noted that 
even if it is agreed that midnight rules tend to be problematic, it is not com-
pletely obvious that reform is necessary.  Presidents may already have suf-
ficient tools to deal with midnight regulation, as demonstrated by action 
taken by the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, 
George W. Bush, and Barack Obama to combat the midnight regulatory ac-
tivity of their respective predecessors.18  For example, in a memorandum 
very similar to the one issued at the outset of the prior administration, on his 
first day in office President Obama directed his administration not to issue 
any new rules until his appointees had a chance to review them, to with-
draw from publication any proposed or final rules that had been sent to the 
Federal Register but not yet published, and to consider extending the effec-
tive date of published rules that had not yet gone into effect so that a new 
appointee could review them.19  With regard to published rules, President 
Obama‘s order directed that if the agency decided to delay the effective 
date, it should immediately reopen the comment period for thirty days to al-
low public comment on whether changes should be made before the rule is 
allowed to go into effect. 
Although incoming Presidents already have tools to combat midnight 
regulation, those tools may not always be up to the task.  While the short 
duration of a temporary suspension may often preclude resolution of a legal 
challenge while the controversy remains live and justiciable, in a decision 
involving the suspension of a midnight rule by the Bush Administration, the 
Second Circuit held that once the rule was finalized and published in the 
Federal Register, in this case on January 22, 2001—two days after President 
George W. Bush took office—the rule had taken effect and could not be 
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there is at least a need for reform in the possibly rare situation in which ac-
tion against midnight rules is subject to legal challenge. 
A. Administrative Law Reform 
The outgoing administration of G.W. Bush was careful to attempt to 
shield its late-term output from revision by the incoming Obama Adminis-
tration.  Josh Bolten, President Bush‘s Chief of Staff, issued a memoran-
dum on May 9, 2008, instructing agencies not to propose any new rules 
after June 1, 2008 and to finalize all rules by November 1, 2008.21  The 
Bush Administration portrayed this as taking the high road against midnight 
regulation by avoiding the unseemly specter of rules being published in the 
Federal Register up to and even past inauguration day, as had occurred at 
the end of the Clinton Administration.  In truth, it was part of an effort to 
shield its midnight rules from the types of actions that the Bush Administra-
tion had taken against President Clinton‘s midnight rules.  Rules completed 
more than sixty days before inauguration day would be final and thus not 
subject to a freeze or easy process of revision by the new administration.  
Thus, Bolten was actually providing agencies a roadmap for avoiding what 
the Bush Administration was able to do to some of the Clinton Administra-
tion‘s midnight rules. 
The Supreme Court‘s application of the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard to rescission and revision of rules has created some of the difficulties 
that incoming administrations encounter when trying to undo midnight 
rules.  Under Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Co.,22 once a rule becomes final, rescission or revision 
must be justified by reasons for the rescission or revision even if the origi-
nal record would have supported a different rule or a decision not to adopt 
any rule.23  This understanding gives an administration a powerful tool, for 
better or for worse, to project its agenda beyond the end of its term. 
In State Farm, the Carter Administration‘s rule requiring passive re-
straints in passenger cars was promulgated in 1977, the first year of the 
Carter Administration, but it did not require any car to be equipped with 
                                                                                                                           
derlying this rule caused it to be a particularly tricky midnight rule to deal with because under the sta-
tute, in what the court called an ―anti-backsliding‖ provision, the agency (Department of Energy) was 
prohibited from ever lowering efficiency standards—new rules could only increase efficiency.  Thus, 
once the court held that the rule was final and effective when published in the Federal Register, the 
agency was stuck with it.  See id. at 197.  Even if the agency had conducted a new notice and comment 
period, as required for published rules by President Obama‘s directive, the anti-backsliding provision 
may still have prevented the incoming administration from changing this midnight rule. 
21
  Memorandum from Josh E. Bolten to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (May 9, 
2008) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) available at 
http://www.ombwatch.org/regs/PDFs/BoltenMemo050908.pdf (link). 
22
  463 U.S. 29 (1983) (link). 
23
  See id. at 44–46. 
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passive restraints until 1982, the second year of the next presidential term.24  
This put the Reagan Administration in the uncomfortable position of being 
the first administration to enforce this regulation even though it did not 
agree with the regulation and had actually campaigned on a deregulatory 
platform.  When the Reagan Administration‘s new agency head attempted 
to rescind the requirement, the Court did not ask whether the original rule-
making record would have supported a decision to make no rule at all.  Ra-
ther, it asked whether there was sufficient new evidence or policy reasons 
for rescinding the rule that had been adopted.25  As soon as the initial regu-
lation was adopted, it became the baseline for evaluating future agency ac-
tion even though it had not actually gone into effect.26 
This application of the arbitrary and capricious standard should be 
reexamined.27  At least with regard to rules that can fairly be characterized 
as midnight regulation, when a new administration takes office, it should 
have the freedom to revise or rescind rules that were adopted by the prior 
administration if the original rulemaking record would have supported the 
new administration‘s decision.28  The baseline should be the statute and reg-
ulatory situation before the outgoing administration acted.  The possible 
counterargument is that this idea pays insufficient heed to the role of agency 
expertise and makes regulation look overly political.  This objection, how-
ever, presumes that midnight regulation is less political than an incoming 
administration‘s potential reactions to the regulation.  To the contrary, there 
are good reasons to believe that a great deal of late-term administrative ac-
tion is political. Moreover, it is also likely, that in the rush to deadline, even 





  See Modified Standard 208, 42 Fed. Reg. 34289 (July 5, 1977).  There is nothing necessarily ne-
farious about time lines like this.  It makes perfect sense in many situations for new rules to be phased, 
strengthened, or even weakened over a long period of time, and in this case, the automobile manufactur-
ers needed a substantial amount of time to prepare for compliance with the rule.  Long lag times can also 
facilitate the exploration of other options.  For example, one feature of the passive restraint rule would 
have rescinded the requirement entirely had two-thirds of states adopted laws requiring auto occupants 
to wear seatbelts within a certain time.  Ultimately, Congress acted to require airbags in all cars, which 
is more satisfactory than agency action from a democratic standpoint. 
25
  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 40–44. 
26
  See also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
once energy efficiency rules were published in the Federal Register, they could not be altered in way 
that violated the statute‘s anti-backsliding provision). 
27
  Beermann, supra note 1, at 1009–15. 
28
  See id. at 1014.  This would be procedurally similar to what often occurs when a court overturns 
an agency rule on judicial review.  When the problem with the rule is lack of a reasoned explanation, the 
court can remand the rule to the agency for a better explanation without requiring the agency to engage 
in a new round of notice and comment.  See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. S.E.C., 443 F.3d 
890, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (―Where the court does not require additional fact gathering on remand . . . the 
agency is typically authorized to determine, in its discretion, whether such fact gathering is needed. . . .   
If the agency determines that additional fact gathering is necessary, then notice and comment are typi-
cally required.‖); Shays v. Federal Election Comm‘n, 414 F.3d 76, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (―Nothing in 
our holding necessarily precludes the FEC from remedying deficiencies in its explanation and repromul-
gating this rule on remand.‖). 
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taken under less time pressure.  Thus, there are certainly practical reasons 
for affording a new administration the freedom to revise or rescind mid-
night rules when the record would support such a change.   
Additionally, two developments in administrative law lend support to 
the idea that a different application of the arbitrary and capricious standard 
to midnight regulation is possible within the constraints of the law.  The 
first is the recent recognition, under the Chevron29 rubric, that agencies are 
free to reinterpret statutes even when a prior agency interpretation has been 
upheld on judicial review.30  Under step two of the Chevron doctrine, which 
is reached when an agency interprets an ambiguous statute, a court defers to 
any reasonable statutory interpretation.  The Court‘s decision in National 
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services made 
clear that because Chevron‘s step two is a very deferential standard of judi-
cial review, under which various interpretations might have been upheld, 
agencies are free to alter their interpretations as long as the new interpreta-
tion is also reasonable.  The baseline against which the new interpretation is 
judged is not the initial interpretation but the statute being interpreted. 
The analogy between an agency‘s ability to reinterpret and a new ad-
ministration‘s ability to revise or rescind is strengthened by the fact that the 
Court understands that interpretation under Chevron is not simply a quest 
for the best understanding of the words used by Congress, but instead re-
quires choosing among plausible interpretations based at least in part on 
considerations of policy.  The Supreme Court recognized this in Chevron 
when it stated: 
In these cases, the Administrator‘s interpretation represents a reasonable ac-
commodation of manifestly competing interests, and is entitled to deference: 
the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the 
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconcil-
ing conflicting policies. . . .  While agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the com-
peting interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or 
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration 
of the statute in light of everyday realities.31 
In its Brand X decision, the Court reiterated this understanding, stating 
that filling statutory gaps ―involves difficult policy choices that agencies are 
better equipped to make than courts.‖32  Thus, the Chevron doctrine—as ap-
plied in Brand X to allow an agency to adopt a new, reasonable, interpreta-
tion—represents an instance of policy alteration in which the baseline is the 





  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (link). 
30
  Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005) (link). 
31
  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66 (citations omitted). 
32
  Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980. 
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repudiated.  There is no apparent reason why an incoming administration 
should not enjoy the same freedom to repudiate the late-term actions of its 
predecessor as long as the new administration pursues its policies within the 
limits imposed by the statutory framework. 
Chevron, together with the additional instances detailed below, also 
stands for the proposition that the application of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard can vary with the circumstances.  The APA standard of judicial re-
view that applies to agency rules is the arbitrary and capricious standard.33  
The Chevron opinion paraphrased the statutory standard but then actually 
constructed what appeared to be a new standard applicable to agency statu-
tory interpretation.  The Chevron Court stated that ―legislative regulations 
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute.‖34  This is a paraphrase of the APA‘s ―arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise contrary to law.‖35  
The Court inserted the word ―manifestly‖ apparently to indicate a degree of 
deference to agency legal interpretations that does not appear to be provided 
for in the statute as written.36 
In at least two subsequent situations, the Court has explicitly endorsed 
a more deferential application of the arbitrary and capricious standard based 
on the context of the agency action involved.  In Massachusetts v. EPA,37 
which rejected the EPA‘s refusal to regulate global warming gases, the 
Court explained that agency decisions rejecting rulemaking petitions are 
subject to judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard, and 
quoted with apparent approval the D.C. Circuit‘s rule that such decisions 
are reviewed on a very deferential standard: ―Refusals to promulgate rules 
are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such review is ‗extremely li-
mited‘ and ‗highly deferential.‘‖38 
This highly deferential version of the arbitrary and capricious review is 
similar to the standard that the Court has applied when reviewing agency 
refusals to bring enforcement actions (when such refusals are reviewable 
because governing law contains clear criteria for when enforcement is re-
quired).  In such cases, the Court has stated that review should be very nar-
row, that the reviewing court should ordinarily look only at the statement of 
reasons the agency has provided for not bringing an enforcement action, 
and that the reviewing court should not even consider the factual basis for 





  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (link). 
34
  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
35
  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
36
  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
37
  549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (link). 
38
  Id. (quoting Nat‘l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass‘n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 
93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
39
  In Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 573 (1975) (link), the Court stated that review of a refusal 
to initiate enforcement action should be very narrow and should not ordinarily look at the record beyond 
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from the usual practice in cases applying the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard in which the reviewing court looks carefully at the facts and reasoning 
underlying the decision in what has been denominated ―hard look‖ review.40 
The lesson to be learned from these examples is that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard is not a static principle that applies uniformly in all con-
texts.  Rather, the Court has found it appropriate to adjust the scope of re-
view when it finds a different standard more appropriate.  While the Court 
in State Farm rejected the argument that review should be relaxed when an 
agency deregulates, that decision does not necessarily reject the desirability 
of an adjustment when an incoming administration acts to deal with mid-
night regulation by its predecessor.  Efforts that enable an incoming admin-
istration to easily alter a previous administration‘s late-term action may 
discourage midnight regulation in the first place. 
Although the focus here is on midnight regulation, this proposal for 
reform should probably not be confined to revisions or rescissions by a new 
administration, but might be extended to increase agency flexibility when-
ever an agency changes its position shortly after issuing a rule.  If an agency 
issues a rule that causes an outcry, either right after issuance or perhaps as a 
more distant effective date approaches, there are good reasons for allowing 
the agency to make revisions without having to use the initial rule as a base-
line.  At this early stage, the agency ought to be able to reshape the rule in 
any way that would have been supportable based on the original rulemaking 
record.  In addition to preserving a measure of flexibility, this would also 
have a desirable procedural effect.  The Supreme Court adverted to the ―in-
herent advantages of informal rulemaking‖ when it rejected the argument 
that courts have the power to require additional procedures in complicated 
or important rulemaking proceedings.41  Along these lines, flexibility in the 
period immediately following notice and comment would enable an agency 
to issue a rule after a single notice and comment period, knowing that if the 
rule provokes an unanticipated outcry, revisions supportable under the orig-
inal record could still be made.  Without this flexibility, agencies might be 
more reluctant to make desirable revisions if such revisions would require 
not only a second round of notice and comment, but also greater justifica-
tion.  They might be more cautious during the initial rulemaking proceed-
                                                                                                                           
the bare reasons offered by the agency for not enforcing.  ―The necessity that the reviewing court refrain 
from substitution of its judgment for that of the Secretary thus helps define the permissible scope of re-
view.  Except in what must be the rare case, the court‘s review should be confined to examination of the 
‗reasons‘ statement, and the determination whether the statement, without more, evinces that the Secre-
tary‘s decision is so irrational as to constitute the decision arbitrary and capricious. Thus, review may 
not extend to cognizance or trial of a complaining member‘s challenges to the factual bases for the Sec-
retary‘s conclusion . . . .‖  Id. 
40
  See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (link); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (link). 
41
  See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547 
(1978) (link). 
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ing, perhaps by adding a second notice and comment period if there is any 
perceived likelihood that a rule will provoke a strong negative reaction.  
While some people might think more notice and comment would be a good 
thing, the Supreme Court‘s preference is to follow Congress‘s model of a 
short and sweet notice and comment process.42 
B. Alternative Statutory Possibilities 
If the Supreme Court declines the invitation to build a solution for the 
midnight regulation problem into administrative law, another possibility is 
for Congress to create a statutory solution along the lines of Representative 
Nadler‘s proposal, but without the defects of that particular bill.  The key 
would be to design a proposal that discouraged the outgoing administration 
from engaging in midnight rulemaking, that gave the incoming administra-
tion effective tools to deal with it, or both.  Despite its limitations, Repre-
sentative Nadler‘s bill could serve as the basis for a better proposal if the 
problems identified in the first Part of this Essay were remedied.  Most of 
the problems with the bill could be solved with a few simple changes.  Be-
low are five changes that directly address the deficiencies highlighted in the 
Nadler bill. 
First, the bill should define midnight rules as ―final rules adopted by an 
agency in the 90 days before inauguration day, i.e. October 22 through Jan-
uary 20 in presidential election years.‖  ―Adopted‖ should be defined as 
something like ―sent to the Federal Register for publication as required by 
law.‖  These changes would clarify the timing issues—that the bill should 
apply only to presidential transitions in election years and that a rule is 
―adopted‖ when it is put in the queue for publication in the Federal Regis-
ter.   
Second, the bill should give the incoming administration the option to 
suspend midnight rules for a certain period after inauguration day, perhaps 
sixty days, rather than suspend all midnight rules automatically.  If the in-
coming administration takes no action within the sixty day period, the rules 
should go into effect as adopted.  This avoids the uncertainty of tying the 
time period to the appointment of a new agency head, which may not hap-
pen at all if the incoming administration is of the same party or if there are 
holdovers from the prior administration, or may not happen for a long time 
if there is a delay in naming or confirming an incoming agency head.  Mak-
ing action optional with the new administration is preferable to a blanket 
automatic suspension because it allows the incoming administration to fo-
cus its attention on issues it finds important.  This could have the negative 
effect of forcing the incoming administration to examine all midnight rules 
quickly, but this seems to be a better alternative than a blanket suspension.  





  See id.; see generally Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GW. L. 
REV. 856 (2007) (link). 
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istrations will seek to avoid midnight rulemaking as consciousness of the 
problem increases. 
Third, the incoming administration should have the option to alter as 
well as disapprove of midnight rules, assuming that the alteration would be 
supported by the original rulemaking record.  If the agency finds it advisa-
ble to make changes beyond those supportable under the original rulemak-
ing record, the agency should have the power to suspend a midnight rule to 
allow the time to conduct a new rulemaking proceeding.  Under Representa-
tive Nadler‘s proposal, review is an all-or-nothing proposition.  This ig-
nores the possibility that the incoming administration will find only some of 
the features of a midnight rule objectionable.  It is easy to imagine the in-
coming administration objecting only to a limited number of features of a 
large midnight rule, and there is no reason for not allowing amendments ra-
ther than wholesale rejection.  Because of the fear that midnight rules may 
be undesirable due to hasty drafting and excessive interest group involve-
ment, the incoming administration should also have the time to conduct a 
new rulemaking proceeding, if it decides one is necessary, without the mid-
night rule going into effect.  Administrations have done this without specif-
ic authorization.  For example, the Clinton Administration suspended the 
abortion gag rule in its first week in office and did not promulgate a substi-
tute until its last year in office.43  It would be better if the incoming adminis-
tration acted with statutory authority rather than created a situation of doubt 
and potential costly litigation.   
Fourth, ―agency‖ should be defined in the bill to include only Execu-
tive Branch agencies and not independent agencies that are less subject to 
presidential control.  The worst dangers of midnight regulation relate vir-
tually exclusively to the politics of the presidential transition.  As explained 
above, because independent agencies are not subject to much if any presi-
dential control, midnight rules issued by them are less likely to be designed 
to embarrass or hinder the incoming administration or to project an out-
going administration‘s policies into the future.  Further, ―midnight‖ at an 
independent agency may come later, when expiring terms or impending res-
ignations shift control of the agency to members of the new President‘s par-
ty.  It would be very difficult and probably unnecessary to write a statute 
that identified the proper time during which an independent agency‘s rule-
making activity should be curtailed due to the possibility of midnight regu-
lation. 
Fifth, rules not subject to notice and comment should not be included 
in any midnight rule reform, mainly because the incoming administration 





  See Beermann, supra note 1, at 963–64. 
44
  There are two sets of exceptions to the APA‘s notice and comment requirements.  First, the APA 
rulemaking provision does not apply to rules involving military and foreign affairs functions and rules 
relating to ―agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.‖  
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outgoing agency issues a policy statement or interpretive rule in its waning 
moments, the incoming agency can simply issue revisions without delay.  
While this would have some of the negative effects of midnight regulation 
discussed above, the lack of substantive effect and the ease of rescission or 
amendment make midnight interpretive rules and policy statements a much 
less serious problem than midnight legislative rules.  
In addition to the above proposals, which are designed to cure the de-
fects in Representative Nadler‘s approach, an alternative statutory possibili-
ty could consist of a more general reform dealing with the administrative 
law issues identified in Part II.A.  A provision could be crafted that would 
give all agencies the power to revise or rescind rules shortly after adoption, 
thereby providing for revisions based on midnight regulation problems, or 
simply to allow second thoughts after promulgation even in the absence of a 
transition in administrations.45  This provision could, for example, give all 
agencies the power to revise or rescind rules within ninety days of adoption 
without a new rulemaking proceeding if the new rule (or no rule at all) 
would have been supported adequately by the original rulemaking record.  
This provision has two virtues—it is simpler than one focused on the mid-
night rulemaking problem, and it increases regulatory flexibility in all pe-
riods, transition or not. 
Finally, a far simpler proposal would be to ban outright the adoption of 
final rules by executive agencies for a specified period of time prior to in-
auguration day, for example 120 days, with exceptions for rules required by 
emergency, statutory deadline, or court order.  This possibility has several 
virtues.  For one, it would reduce the load that incoming administrations 
currently bear—there would be few or no midnight regulations to sift 
through since all regulations would have been finalized longer before elec-
tion day than is currently the case.  While this reform might be viewed as an 
empty gesture since it would merely move up the deadline, in effect, chang-
ing the clock and making midnight come a few months early in election 
years has the additional virtue of placing all late-term rules in the sunshine 
of the public record long enough before election day for the public to be 
made aware of them.  This should discourage many midnight rules that ap-
pear to be farewell gifts to interest groups.  It would, however, not allow 
cooperation between incoming and outgoing administrations in my ―waiting 
category,‖ within which a cooperative outgoing administration clears away 
                                                                                                                           
5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2006) (link).  The notice and comment requirements also do not apply to ―interpreta-
tive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.‖  5 
U.S.C. § 553(b).  Publication requirements may still apply.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2006) (link). 
45
  A statute to this effect might have led the Second Circuit to allow President George W. Bush‘s 
Department of Energy to act against the last-minute rule issued by the Clinton Administration concern-
ing the energy efficiency of central air condition and heat pumps that the Second Circuit held the Bush 
Administration could not revise in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d 
Cir. 2004).  It is unclear whether this statutory reform would override the anti-backsliding provision of 
the statute at issue in Abraham, but in most situations it would allow agencies to adjust their rules for a 
brief period after issuance. 
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difficult issues late in the term as an aid to the incoming administration.  
Further, the ban would apply even when it would not be necessary, for ex-
ample, when an incumbent is reelected or when the new President is of the 
same party as the prior President.  It also assumes the worst—that all out-
going administrations are behaving badly rather than carrying on the busi-
ness of government to the end, perhaps even in consultation with the 
incoming administration.  In such cases, the work of career agency em-
ployees could needlessly be slowed to a crawl every four years around elec-
tion time. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent research confirms that midnight regulation has long been a fea-
ture of the transition between administrations.46  The general view is that 
midnight regulation is an illegitimate vehicle for projecting an outgoing 
administration‘s policy agenda beyond the end of its term.  For this and ad-
ditional reasons disfavoring midnight regulation, Representative Jerrold 
Nadler‘s proposed Midnight Rule Act is a step in the right direction.  With 
the refinements discussed above, it might prevent some of the most egre-
gious examples of midnight regulation.  Reforms to administrative law or 
simpler proposals that simply suspend rulemaking activity at the end of 
each presidential term might accomplish the same goal.  This Essay has out-
lined and analyzed these various possibilities with the hope of enhancing 
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